This paper explores the empirical link between income inequality and inflation in ten OECD countries over the period 1971 to 2010. In addition to inflation, we include six control variables in our analysis: economic development level, business cycles, unemployment, unionization, openness to international trade and skill-biased technological change. We estimate the empirical link between all seven variables and income inequality with a balanced panel. We find a U-shaped link between long-run inflation and income inequality. Low inflation rates are associated with higher income inequality. As inflation goes up, inequality decreases, reaches a minimum with an inflation rate of about 13%, and then starts rising again. The precise mechanisms that lead more inflation to correlate with a decrease in income inequality until a certain threshold are unclear yet, and warrant further research.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, income inequality has risen in most developed countries (see, e.g., Saez, 2011, or Piketty, 2014 (Federal Reserve, 2013) This paper aims to contribute to understanding whether the factors mentioned by Chairman Bernanke are the only ones that explain the growth in income inequality, or whether monetary policy has distributive effects, and thus may have played a role in this development. We focus our analysis on the impact of inflation, which central banks usually target and partially control, to get first insights. More specifically, we explore whether inflation affects income distribution in developed economies. We analyze seven factors that could influence income inequality: inflation, economic development level, business cycles, unemployment, unionization, openness to international trade and skill-biased technological change. The last six factors are the most widely cited in the literature to explain rising income inequality. We estimate the empirical link between all seven variables and income inequality with a balanced panel.
METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

SUMMARY OF RESULTS
We find a U-shaped link between long-run inflation and income inequality. Low inflation rates are associated with higher income inequality. As inflation goes up, inequality decreases, reaches a minimum with an inflation rate of about 13%, and then starts rising again.
We conclude from our analysis that inflation may not be neutral for income inequality.
However, the precise mechanisms that lead more inflation to correlate with a decrease in income inequality until a certain inflation rate threshold and to coincide with a rise in income inequality thereafter are unclear yet. We need more research, both theoretical and empirical, to explain our findings. 3
STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
The next section lists the economic factors, which are the most often cited as drivers of income inequality. In particular, it reviews the research about their link to income inequality. Section 3 explains the econometric methodology used in this paper to assess the empirical link between inflation and income inequality. Section 4 presents the data.
Section 5 shows the results that we find with our dataset and methodology. Section 6 concludes.
2 DRIVERS OF INEQUALITY -LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we first review potential channels linking inflation with income inequality and then turn our attention to other factors that economists frequently cite as drivers of growing income inequality in developed economies.
INFLATION
Inflation does not affect all income sources homogeneously. Since households differ in their sources of income, the impact of inflation on their total incomes will not be homogeneous either. By affecting each household differently, inflation can thus modify the income distribution. To identify the potential channels through which inflation can potentially increase or decrease income inequality, let us first divide total income into three categories: labor income, capital income and government transfers.
Labor income
Inflation can modify labor income distribution through two channels: an inflation exposure channel and the Cantillon effect. The inflation exposure channel has its roots in the fact that wages are linked to inflation in different degrees. A wage, which is contractually indexed to inflation, is by definition better hedged against inflation than a wage, which is not. Similarly, bonuses are often proportional to a firm's stock performance, which in turn may move with inflation thus providing a hedge.
The Cantillon effect reflects the lag between the moments when money is created, and when this expansion translates into inflation (see e.g. Bordo, 1983) . Concretely, new money hits the agents first that are the closest to the money creation process (e.g. bank employees) (Williamson, 2008, and Ledoit, 2011) . These agents will see their income rise and spend the additional money to buy goods and services, which in turn leads to further spending by other economic agents and thus gradually -but only gradually -to inflation. This lag can be a further temporary factor affecting income distribution.
Capital income
Capital income, i.e. the dividends and interest payments from investments, is a second income source for households -and one that may in fact offer several possibilities to hedge against inflation. Access to financial markets, however, is not equal between households due to entry costs and barriers. The resulting financial market segmentation disadvantages low-income households, and thus, their use of financial innovations to better hedge against inflation. Cysne, Maldonado, and Klinger Monteiro (2005) The impact of inflation on government transfers depends on the degree of inflation adjustment in each country's transfer scheme. Generally, when transfers are indexed, lower-income households benefit as they receive, on average, a larger share of their income from transfers (e.g. unemployment benefits, food stamps).
Review of empirical results
With the theory referenced above not giving a clear answer whether inflation increases or decreases income inequality, we turn to the empirical evidence -which does not provide an uncontested answer either. Galli and van der Hoeven (2001) review pre-2000 empirical literature on the topic. They find that "the results from all these studies are noticeably mixed -some authors find inflation to be a regressive tax, others find it to be a progressive tax, and others find it to be unrelated to income distribution -so that the literature seems to have generated an inflation-inequality puzzle."
Further empirical studies add to this puzzle. On the one hand, Albanesi (2007) On the other hand, Sun (2011) and Maestri and Roventini (2012) find that inflation reduces average wealth and income inequality. Similarly, Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng, and Silvia (2012) show that a permanent increase in the inflation target 3 decreases income inequality, and Heer and Maussner (2004) find that higher inflation marginally reduces inequality.
Galli and van der Hoeven (2001) offer a reconciliation of these contradicting results by assuming a non-linear relation between inflation and income distribution. They show that a rise in inflation can both reduce inequality or increase inequality, depending on the initial inflation rate. Rising inflation is associated with a decrease in inequality for low initial inflation rates and with an increase for high initial inflation rates. Bulir (2001) and Auda (2010) find similar results. 4 Romer and Romer (1998) find that the slope of income distribution changes with inflation. 6 2.2 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LEVEL Kuznets (1955) explains growing income inequality based on income levels. The so-called Kuznets hypothesis states that countries shift from relative equality to inequality and back to greater equality as they move through economic development stages. His graphical representation of this view, the Kuznets curve, shows an inverted U-shape for the link between GDP per capita and income inequality.
Empirical analyses contradict Kuznets' hypothesis. A first comprehensive study by Bulir and Gulde (1995) concludes that the Kuznets hypothesis explains only a very limited part of the inter-country variation in income distribution. Studies that are more recent reject
Kuznets' hypothesis more clearly. Gallup (2012) reports that "new international panel data with the first internally consistent time series for a large number of countries show no evidence of a Kuznets curve" as the link between economic development level and inequality is not constant across countries. Similarly, Hossain (2013) concludes that Kuznets' hypothesis is not confirmed as some countries experience an increase in income inequality along with economic development level after an estimated threshold level of income, while other countries experience a negative relationship between inequality and economic development level before it. Lim and Sek (2014) find a positive link between economic development and inequality for high-income countries where the Kuznets hypothesis would assume a negative relationship. They find no statistically significant link for other countries.
BUSINESS CYCLES
Business cycles are another cited factor influencing income distribution. Early literature finds that the income share of the highest income groups in the interwar U.S. economy rose in recessions and declined in booms (Mendershausen, 1946, Kuznets and Jenks, 1953) . However, research that is more recent shows that this link has weakened after World War II (Parker, 1998, and Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull, 1998) . Recently, Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010) document that the earnings for the lower percentiles of the income distribution decline very rapidly in recessions, such that recessions are times when earnings inequality widens sharply. Finally, Maestri and Roventini (2012) find that inequality is counter-cyclical in a set of OECD countries.
UNEMPLOYMENT
The link between unemployment and income inequality is a further factor widely studied in the literature. The empirical results are mixed. In a first study, Castaneda, DiazGimenez and Rios-Rull (1997) find that unemployment does a poor job in accounting for changing income shares of income groups observed across business cycles. For the United States, Heer and Süssmuth (2003) find that unemployment does not significantly correlate with Gini coefficients in a simple linear regression, but show a significant positive link between unemployment and Gini coefficients in an error correction model. For the same country, Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) show that the incomes of high-income households are less sensitive to unemployment than those of low-income households, which implies that income inequality increases with unemployment. In OECD countries, Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa (2008) and Maestri and Roventini (2012) find that higher unemployment rates increase inequality, measured with either personal income ratios or Gini coefficients. Eklil (2011) challenges their results, as he does not find any significant link between Gini coefficients and unemployment rates.
UNIONIZATION
Labor market institutions -such as unions, minimum wages or unemployment benefits -may affect income inequality through three channels: the wage differential between categories of workers, the labor share in income compared to the capital share, and the unemployment rate.
Theoretically, the impact of labor market institutions is ambiguous (OECD, 2011). For example, Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa (2010) show that both higher union power and unemployment benefits increase the unemployment rate, which, if anything, tends to raise income inequality, but reduce the relative wage differentials between people working, which tends to lower income inequality.
Their paper also provides an empirical study of the link between labor market institutions and income inequality in OECD countries over 40 years. They find that greater union density and a higher degree of wage bargaining coordination have opposing effects on income inequality: the former decreases inequality while the latter increases it. In the European Union, Dafermos and Papatheodorou (2013) find that labor market institutions have no sound empirical link with income inequality, with the exception of unionization, which appears conducive to a more equal income distribution. A link between the decline in unionization and the increase in income inequality is also highlighted by Visser and Checchi (2009) . In an analysis over 83 countries, Gkinni and Vasilki (2013) estimate that employment protection 5 decreases income inequality. Since unionization is shown to be a significant factor in several studies, we choose to focus on this aspect of labor market institutions.
OPENNESS TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Denser international trade is another recurrent explanation for growing income inequality. Many economists argue that foreign competition, especially from developing 8 countries, depresses developed economies wages for low skilled labor and worsens income distribution accordingly.
Empirical evidence on this link between growing international trade and income distribution is mixed. Spilimbergo, Londono and Szekely (1999) find that the effects of trade openness on inequality depend on initial factor endowments. Moore and Ranjan (2005) ICT boost, first, the demand for skilled workers (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003 , Jorgenson and Timmer, 2011 , Katz and Margo, 2013 , Michaels, Natraj and Van Reenen, 2013 and, second, their relative productivity (Faggio, Salvanes and Van Reenen, 2010) .
Moreover, Goldin and Katz (2007) find a sharp decline in skill supply growth because of a slowdown in educational attainment since 1980. Several authors view the conjunction of higher demand for skills, higher productivity for skilled workers and weaker growth in skilled supply as the crucial explanation for increasing wage inequality in developed economies since the 1980s (Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998 , Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2006 , Goldin und Katz, 2008 , van Reenen, 2011 .
Empirical validations of the SBTC hypothesis are difficult to provide as only imperfect statistical measures of SBTC are available. Card and DiNardo (2002) use the share of ICT industry output in GDP and the percentage of workers using computers as proxies. A further example is Michaels, Natraj and Van Reenen (2010) who use a measure of ICT capital at the firm level to check if it correlates with wage inequality.
Most studies rely on indirect observations of SBTC effects, by introducing SBTC in a model via theoretical restrictions or frictions in the equations and then checking whether the generated dynamics are similar to those observed in reality. Using this methodology, several authors find support for the SBTC hypothesis. Galor and Moav (2000) show that a growth model characterized by skill-biased technological transition is consistent with the observed increase in income inequality in the United States and other advanced countries over the past decades. According to Haskel and Slaughter (2002) , the degree of skill-biased technology in each industry sector can explain differences in sectors' skill premia in ten OECD countries over the 1970s and 1980s. Moore and Ranjan (2005) In this section, we present the data used to analyze the link between inflation and income inequality. We first describe the data used and their source and then study their stationarity properties. Appendix A displays all the data used.
DESCRIPTION
Income inequality
Our indicator of income inequality is the share of total pre-tax income of the top 10%
earners. This variable comes from the World Top Income Database (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2013) . It is computed from national tax declarations and includes labor income, capital income, and government transfers. It does not include capital gains.
Inflation
We measure inflation by the CPI annual growth rate. We decompose this growth rate in two components: a long-term trend (i.e. long-run inflation) 6 and short-term cycles (i.e. inflation cycles). We estimate these two components with a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, which we run independently for each country. Our data source is the World Top Income
Database (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2013) .
Economic development level and business cycles
We decompose real GDP per capita into a long-term trend (i.e. economic development level) and business cycle fluctuations with a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. We run the HP filter independently for each country. We use the data for real GDP per capita from the Penn World Table database provided by Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2013) .
Unemployment
We measure unemployment by the official unemployment rates taken from OECD (2014).
Openness to international trade
To assess the openness of a country, we take the ratio of its exports and imports over GDP. Data comes from the Penn World Table database .
Unionization
To measure unionization, we use the number of workers that are members of a union divided by the total number of workers in a country. Our source is Visser (2013) .
Skill-biased technological change
To test the SBTC hypothesis, we have to quantify the pace of technological change. For this we collect data on three dimensions of IT progress: the penetration rates of mobile phones, of internet and of landlines. We use the data on these indicators from the International Telecommunication Union (2014).
To summarize these three indices with one indicator, we apply principal components analysis. This technique measures the co-movements in all three dimensions to highlight changes that are common to all indices. It thus gives a proxy to assess the common technological progress made in all three indices.
STATIONARITY TESTS
Before turning to the analysis of the empirical link between inflation and inequality, we study the stationarity properties of our series. For that, we first perform a unit root test assuming a common unit root process in the series (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002) , then we use three tests that assume individual unit roots for each series (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003) . The results are presented in Table 1 .
The different tests show us that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be strongly rejected for income inequality, long-term inflation, GDP per capita, trade openness, union density and skill-biased technological change. We therefore cannot guarantee that the series we are working with are stationary. To eliminate the problems associated with non-stationary time series, we will work with series in difference for the rest of this paper. 
METHODOLOGY
To assess the impact of the different factors referred to above on income inequality, we estimate the following econometric specification
where is the income inequality indicator for country at period , is a constant, is a vector of coefficients, is a matrix of factors and is a vector of error terms.
We test two models: one with long-run inflation only and one with long-run inflation and its squared term. The first model estimates a linear link between inflation and inequality; the second, a non-linear link between these two variables. In both models, we estimate a non-linear link between economic development level and inequality. We test for non-linearity because, in the case of inflation, Romer and Romer (1998), Galli and van der Hoeven (2001) , Bulir (2001) and Auda (2010) empirically find a non-linear relation between inflation and income distribution, and in the case of economic development, the Kuznets hypothesis postulates an inverted U-shape curve.
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5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS Table 1 presents our empirical results. We use a generalized least square estimator. In a preliminary estimation, we detected cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in the residuals; we thus use cross-section weights to correct for this feature and thus get an efficient estimator of the coefficients.
PANEL ANALYSIS
We find a significant negative correlation between long-run inflation and income inequality in both models. In addition, in our expanded model, we identify a positive link between squared long-run inflation and income inequality indicating that the relationship between these two variables is U-shaped. As in Galli and van der Hoeven (2001) as well as Auda (2010), we find that for low inflation levels, more inflation correlates with decreasing income inequality, and that for high inflation levels, more inflation coincides with increasing income inequality. Our estimate for the turning point is an inflation rate of 13.3%. Below this threshold, income inequality decreases as inflation rises; above it, income inequality increases as inflation rises further. For comparison, Galli and van der Hoeven (2001) find a threshold between 7.1% and 8.6% for the US and between 12.5% and 13.3% for a panel of 15 OECD countries. We find no significant link between short-term inflation cycles and income inequality in our models.
We identify a significant nonlinear link between economic development level and income inequality. However, contrary to the Kuznets hypothesis, we do not find an inverted Ushape curve, but a normal U-shape curve. This implies that after observing a decrease in inequality due to a higher level of economic development in the beginning of our Inflation with minimum inequality * (**, ***) statistically significant at the 10% (5%, 1%) confidence level All variables in differences -13.3
Without squared inflation
With squared inflation 1971-2010 1971-2010 390 390 14 sample period, we observe an increase of income inequality as economic development levels rise. This result strengthens those of Gallup (2012) as well as Lim and Sek (2014) , who provide the latest findings on the link between economic development level and income inequality.
Our result seems to be in contradiction with Kuznets' theory; however, a closer look might reconcile the two. Kuznets explains that income distribution follows cycles:
income inequality increases as workers move from an old industry to new ones to capture productivity growth and then decreases, as most of the working force is included in the new industry sector. A positive link between economic development level and income inequality, as found in our sample, might reflect the fact that developed countries have left one Kuznets cycle and are now in the first phase of a new one. This means that the growing inequality associated with economic development level might indicate that workers are currently moving from traditional industry sectors to new ones and that these economies are in an industrial transition phase.
We find a significant procyclical link between business cycles and income inequality. Our results seem to be in contradiction with other empirical results (see, e.g. Castaneda,
Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull, 1998), who find that income inequality is countercyclical.
However, the comparison between results is difficult to make for two reasons: first, our sample incorporates 15 more years of data. Second, in our study, we separate business cycles from long-run growth. In previous studies, business cycles and long-term components are not distinguished.
In both models, we find a slightly significant positive link between unemployment and inequality, i.e. higher unemployment is associated with higher inequality. This positive empirical link is the one theoretically expected. It is in line with other empirical studies that find a positive link or no significant link between unemployment and income inequality (see Section 2).
We do not find any significant link between openness to trade and income inequality in our model. This result is in line with recent studies, such as Meschi and Vivarelli (2007) , Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009) and Eklil (2011) , who find that trade openness has no significant distributional impact.
We identify a significant negative correlation between unionization rate and income inequality. This means that a higher unionization rate is associated with less income inequality. This result is in line with findings by Visser and Checchi (2009) for a sample of 25 developed countries and by Dafermos and Papatheodorou (2013) for EU countries.
We do not find any significant link between our indicator of skill-biased technological change and income distribution. This result adds to the observation of a lack of solid empirical proofs on the impact of SBTC on income inequality, as pointed out by Mishel, Shierholz and Schmitt (2013) in their review of empirical studies on the topic.
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QUANTIFYING THE EMPIRICAL IMPACT OF EACH COUNTRY
Until now, we have concentrated on the empirical relationship existing over the whole sample of 10 countries. To get an idea whether our results are robust on the whole sample or whether only few individual countries influence them, we repeatedly reestimate our models with a sample that each time excludes one specific country. The results are presented in Table 3 and in Table 4 .
They show that the negative link between inflation and income inequality is robust to the exclusion of each country. The links between economic development level, business cycles and inequality also remains robust to single country exclusion.
COEFFICIENTS STABILITY
To assess the stability of the negative empirical link between long-run inflation and inequality, we also re-estimate our panel over a rolling sample of 10 years. Figure 10 presents the results. A dotted line indicates that the coefficient is not significant at the 5% level. We observe a significant negative link between inflation and inequality over the sample 1971 to 1987 and between 1983 and 1997 . The U-shape curve seems however to be a more recent feature, as it starts in 1995. 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 ** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 *** GDP per capita (business cycles) 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** Unemployment rate 0.11 * 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.13 * 
CONCLUSION
Empirically, we find a strong negative link between inflation and income inequality in a panel of 10 OECD countries over the period . The relationship between the two variables is statistically significant over the whole sample and robust to the exclusion of individual countries. When we allow for nonlinearity, the relationship turns into a U-shape. At low inflation levels, the observed income inequality is high. It then decreases to reach a minimum at an inflation rate of about 13%, and then rises as inflation goes further up. Other studies also highlight this non-linear relationship (Galli and van der Hoeven, 2001 , Bulir, 2001 , and Auda, 2010 .
While the empirical evidence compiled in this paper and in other studies attests a solid link between inflation and income inequality, we lack a theory that explains the channels through which inflation changes incomes distribution. More theoretical and empirical work is necessary to understand how inflation and income distribution interact and influence each other.
Another important issue is that, in this paper, we look at the link between realized inflation and income inequality. We thus neglect the important distinction between anticipated inflation and inflation surprises. We also do not analyze the role played by the inflation targets set by central banks to conduct their monetary policy. An interesting expansion of this study would be to account for these additional dimensions and their impact on income inequality. A better understanding of the role of anticipated inflation and inflation targets for income inequality would also be an important pillar for a reflection of income distribution issues in monetary policy frameworks.
Finally, in this paper, we only looked at the empirical link between inequality and other factors. We did not impose any theoretical restrictions to our model. However, we know that factors such as unemployment, business cycles and inflation are linked with each other. Imposing further theoretical structure among such variables might help us to better disentangle the individual from the common effect of each of these factors on income inequality. A structural VAR might be a good first step to model such interdependencies.
